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Abstract
Because of the complex interdependence of physics and mathematics their relation is not
free of tensions. The paper looks at how the tension has been perceived and articulated by
some physicists, mathematicians and mathematical physicists. Some sources of the tension
are identified and it is claimed that the tension is both natural and fruitful for both physics
and mathematics. An attempt is made to explain why mathematical precision is typically not
welcome in physics.
1 The ”supermarket picture” of the relation of physics
and mathematics, and Tension of type I
According to what can be called the standard picture of the relation of physics and mathematics,
physics is a science in the modern sense because it is systematically mathematical, which means
two things:
(a) Physics carries out precision measurements aiming at determining values of operationally
defined physical quantities. This is what quantitative experimental physics does, and this
ensures descriptive accuracy of physics.
(b) Physics sets up mathematical models of physical phenomena that make explicit the func-
tional relationships among the measured quantities; i.e. physics formulates general quan-
titative physical laws. This is the main activity in theoretical physics and this enables
physics to be predictively successful.
Both descriptive accuracy and predictive success should be understood here with a number of
qualifications: the descriptive accuracy is never perfect (experimental errors); the operationally
defined quantities are not purely empirical (theory-ladenness of observations), natural laws may
also refer to entities that are not observable strictly speaking, etc.
While the standard picture of the relation of mathematics and physics as characterized by
(a) and (b) captures crucial properties of the role of mathematics in physics, it is somewhat
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naive because it is (tacitly) based on what I call here the ”supermarket picture” of the relation
of mathematics and physics: that mathematics is like a supermarket and physics is a customer.
That is to say, it is tacitly assumed that when a physicist needs a mathematical concept, a
mathematical structure, or any mathematical tool to formulate the mathematical model of a
physical phenomenon, then (s)he just goes to the mathematics-supermarket, looks at the shelves,
takes off the product needed, and, possibly after some adjustment and tinkering with it after
checkout, (s)he has the mathematical tool suitable to set up the mathematical model.
But this assumption is non-trivial; so non-trivial that it frequently does not hold: mathe-
matical concepts are (frequently) not available in strict, precise, consistent mathematical sense
and form at the time needed for physics. Moreover, creating the needed mathematical concepts
might take a considerable amount of time. Since physics cannot stand still and wait until the
right mathematical concepts have been worked out, physics will necessarily be mathematically
sloppy, imprecise, even inconsistent during this time.
One can cite several historical examples to back up this claim. In the next section four
(well-known) examples are given. The tension between physics and mathematics arising from
the need in physics of some mathematical concepts that are not available at a given time in
mathematics I call Tension of type I.
2 Examples of Tension of type I
2.1 The missing derivative in Newton’s mechanics
Newton would have needed the concept of derivative of a function to formulate the second law
of motion. But this concept was not available in mathematics in precise form until the work of
Cauchy and Weierstrass in the 19th century. So Newton did what he could: reasoning in an
inconsistent manner involving infinitesimals (quantities that were assumed to have both finite
and zero value) to calculate derivatives. To be more precise, Newton used both algebraic and
geometric methods in his calculations. The algebraic one relied on the notion of infinitesimals;
the geometric reasonings use ”ultimate ratios of vanishing quantities” [11][p. 320]. The algebraic
calculations were not published until after the Principia, in which geometric reasonings dominate.
Logical problems with both reasonings had been pointed out already in Newton’s time:
Berkeley was to observe in the Analyst (1734) that the ”limits of vanishing quantities”
employed in the Principia are as mysterious as the infinitesimals, since the ”ultimate
ratio of two vanishing quantities”, when the quantities are ”vanished” is 0/0, and
before they have vanished the ratio is not the ”ultimate”. [11][p. 320]
Concerning the reasoning in terms of infinitesimals, Berkeley writes in The Analyst (1734):
For when it is said, let the increments vanish, i.e. let the increments be nothing, or let
there be no increments, the former supposition that the increments were something,
or that there were increments, is destroyed, and yet a consequence of that supposition,
i.e. an expression got by virtue thereof, is retained. Which, by the foregoing lemma,
is a false way of reasoning. [...]
[The foregoing Lemma:]
‘If with a view to demonstrate any proposition, a certain point is supposed, by virtue
of which certain other points are attained; and such supposed point be it self after-
wards destroyed or rejected by a contrary supposition; in that case, all the other points
attained thereby, and consequent thereupon, must also be destroyed and rejected, so
as from thence forward to be no more supposed or applied in the demonstration.’
This is so plain as to need no proof. [4][p. 5-6]
It should be noted that, while it is standard view in history of mathematics that Newton did
not have a consistent concept of limit and only since Cauchy’s work is this notion available in
precise (”epsilon-delta”) form, the standard view is contested by B. Pourciau [19], who claims
that Newton had a very clear concept of limit. It is incontestable however that the concept
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of derivative had not been available in the mathematics supermarket when it was needed for
mechanics, and Newton was struggling with creating it.
2.2 Missing spectral theory of selfadjoint operators in quantum
mechanics before von Neumann
Hilbert space quantum theory was established systematically in a mathematically precise form by
von Neumann, and was summarized in his book [38]. The book was based on three foundational
papers, [34] [36], [35], all published in 1927 (they were communicated by M. Born in May and in
November of 1927). Of these three papers the first [34] introduced the notion of abstract Hilbert
space and treated the ”eigenvalue problem” of (possibly unbounded) selfadjoint operators having
possibly a continuous part in their spectrum in a mathematically consistent manner, without
using the Dirac delta function. The technically complete, full analysis of the spectral theorem
was worked out by von Neumann in a substantial paper published in 1930 only [37] (the paper
was received by the journal on December 15, 1928). These mathematically precise papers had
been preceded by a paper co-authored by Hilbert, von Neumann and Nordheim [13] (received by
Mathematische Annalen on April 6, 1927). This latter paper is the first attempt to systematize
(axiomatize) standard Hilbert space quantum mechanics, and the paper is based on Hilbert’s
lecture on foundations of quantum mechanics in 1926. Although the paper was published in a
mathematics journal, the authors are aware that the calculations they present there do not meet
the criteria of precise mathematics:
From a mathematical point of view the method of calculation is rather unsatisfactory
because one is never certain whether the operations involved are really admissible.
For this reason we do not detail them further. But we hope to return to these issues
on another occasion. [13][p. 30. my translation1].
and they refer to von Neumann’s forthcoming paper [34] in which the problem is treated in a
mathematically general and precise manner.
The point in this example is this: until the publication of von Neumann’s two foundational
papers [34] and [37] the ”eigenvalue problem” could not be (and was not) treated in physics in a
mathematically precise manner. Quantum mechanics was thus mathematically sloppy until the
publication of these papers: the notion of spectrum was foggy, assumptions were made that were
false (that every element in the spectrum is an eigenvalue), and the relation of spectrum and the
operator was unclear. One should realize that this sloppiness concerned a central assumption
in quantum mechanics: that the possible values of observables are elements of the spectrum of
the operators representing the observables, and it was a great achievement of the theory that it
could describe mathematically the empirically observed spectrum of the hydrogen atom.
2.3 Missing ergodic theory in classical statistical mechanics be-
fore von Neumann
The concept of ergodicity goes back to the work of Boltzmann in the second half of the 19th
century. Ergodicity of the dynamical system describing the time evolution of the physical system
of many particles moving according to the laws of motion of classical mechanics was supposed
to ensure that the time averages of macroscopic observables are equal to the phase averages
of these observables. But making this idea mathematically precise turned out to be extremely
challenging:
It took quite a time until the mathematical object of the ergodic hypothesis was
found. Indeed only in 1929, Koopman [15], began to investigate groups of measure-
1German original: Vom mathematischen Standpunkt ist aber die dabei eingeschlagene Rechnungsweise [...] ziemlich
unbefriedigend, da man nie sicher ist, in welchem Umfange die dabei auftretenden Operationen wirklich zula¨ssig
sind. Deshalb sehen wir zuna¨chst von der weiteren Ausfu¨hrung dieser Gedanken ab. Wir hoffen jedoch, bei anderer
Gelegenheit auf diese Fragen zuru¨ckkommen zu ko¨nnen.
3
preserving transformations of a measure space, or in other language, groups of unitary
operators in a Hilbert space. [29]
Koopman’s idea (”Koopmanism”) enabled one to investigate the problem of ergodicity of dy-
namical systems in terms of functional analysis, and it was in this formalism that the first
rigorous mathematical result (”Mean Ergodic Theorem”) was obtained by von Neumann [39]:
he proved that the time average exists in the topology defined by the Hilbert space norm. von
Neumann’s work also made clear that the concept of ergodicity needed for the equality of time
and phase averages is metric transitivity : the condition that there exist no measurable subsets
of the constant energy hypersurface that are invariant with respect to the dynamic and which
have non-trivial measure [18]. Thus it became conceptually clear that for the foundations of
classical statistical mechanics one should prove that the dynamical systems are ergodic in the
sense of metric transitivity. But proving metric transitivity also turned out to be an extremely
difficult problem:
After more than one hundred years, ergodicity is still not established in the simplest
mechanical model, in the system of elastic hard balls though I expect we are not far
from a solution. But as to generic interactions, even the questions are not clearly
posed and it might well be that there will not be a final understanding after the next
hundred years either. [29]
It should be noted that it is controversial whether the equality of time and phase space averages
along the lines of ergodicity is indeed crucial for the foundations of classical statistical mechanics
[5], [7]. The point by recalling this episode is not that I wish to defend the significance of
ergodicity for classical statistical mechanics but to illustrate that to the extent this notion was
thought in physics to be important before the concepts of dynamical systems and of the notion
of ergodicity became precise, physics was sloppy and foggy, and that it took a very long time
before the mathematically acceptably clear and physically relevant concepts have been found.
2.4 Missing operator valued tempered distribution in quantum
field theory before Wightman
Presence of mathematical inconsistencies in relativistic quantum field theory were very well
known after the first attempts to quantize fields had been made; the inconsistency is explicitly
mentioned by R.F. Streater and A.S. Wightman:
[...] the quantum theory of fields never reached a stage where one could say with
confidence that it was free from internal contradictions – nor the converse. In fact,
the Main Problem of quantum field theory turned out to be to kill it or cure it : either
to show that the idealizations involved in the fundamental notions of the theory are
incompatible in some physical sense, or to recast the theory in such a form that it
provides a practical language for the description of elementary particle dynamics. [...]
[27][Introduction], emphasis added.
Wightman’s solution of the inconsistency problem was to follow Hilbert’s suggestion in his ”6th
problem” [12], [41], [23]. Hilbert asked for the axiomatization of physical theories and this is
what Wightman did in quantum field theory. In this axiomatization2 (summarized in [27]; for
a compact presentation see [25][section IX.8]) Wightman (i) separated mathematical model and
physical interpretation of mathematical model sharply and explicitly; (ii) stipulated mathemat-
ical axioms for the mathematical model; (iii) formulated the task of showing that the axioms
are consistent by creating models. The crucial mathematical concept in terms of which the ax-
iomatization was carried out was the notion of smeared field : the assignment of an (unbounded)
operator to the functions in the Schwartz space of rapidly decreasing smooth functions on which
tempered distributions are defined. One of the axioms required that the expectation values of
2The axiomatization was formulated in a joint paper by A. Wightman and L. G˚aarding [42] and thus it is some-
times called Wightman-G˚arding axiomatization; however, the shorter name ”Wightman axiomatization” has become
standard and I follow this terminology.
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the operators, viewed as maps from the Schwartz space, be tempered distributions in the sense
of distribution theory established by L. Schwartz. This was in sharp contrast to the naive idea
(which was the source of inconsistency) that a quantum field theory assigns operators to singular
spacetime points. Treating quantum fields as operator valued tempered distributions allowed
proving that the axioms are consistent by constructing models describing free (non-interacting)
quantum fields (see [25][section X.7] for a summary).
From the perspective of Tension of type I the point in this example is this: The concept
of quantum field as operator valued tempered distribution that is needed for a mathematically
consistent model of quantum field theory had not been available in the mathematics supermarket
at the time it was needed for physics, i.e. when first attempts were made to quantize fields in the
1920s. Moreover, this concept could not have been created before the mathematically precise
notion of distribution was created by Schwartz in the 1940’s: Schwartz published the theory in
four papers in the period 1945-1949, summarized the theory in his two-volume book [26], and it
is known that he had the concept of tempered distribution in 1947 [17][p. 157].
It should be noted that this example has not only historical interest, it is very relevant form
the perspective of today’s physics: Constructing mathematically precise models of interacting
quantum fields in (3+1) dimension is still an open problem:
Despite these successes [of the Standard Model], however, establishing the Standard
Model (or part of it) as a mathematically complete and consistent quantum field
theory remains an unsettled challenge. [9]
Though it [QFT] has undergone a long and complex development from its origins [...]
and has attained an ever increasing theoretical sophistication, it is still not clear in
which sense the physically central quantum field theories such as quantum electro-
dynamics (QED), quantum chromodynamics (QCD) and the Standard Model (SM)
are mathematically well defined theories based upon fundamental physical principles
that go beyond the merely ad hoc. [28]
3 Tension of type I drives mathematical developments
Many other examples for Tension of type I could be found in the history of physics. This
indicates that the phenomenon is natural. Not only natural but also useful: The tension be-
tween physics and mathematics caused by missing mathematical concepts and the presence of
the contradictions drives the development in mathematics. This idea was formulated by von
Neumann:
The most vitally characteristic fact about mathematics is, in my opinion, its quite
peculiar relationship to the natural sciences, or, more generally, to any science which
interprets experience on a higher than purely descriptive level. [...] It is undeniable
that some of the best inspirations in mathematics — in those parts of it which are as
pure mathematics as one can imagine — have come from the natural sciences. [40],
emphasis added
But von Neumann is not the only mathematician taking this position. More recent formulations
of the same idea (with emphasis on specific fields) can be found in the replies of prominent
mathematicians to the paper by Jaffe and Quinn [14]. Here are two characteristic views:
D. Ruelle:
The importance for pure mathematics of ideas coming from theoretical physics is of
course well known... [...] the physical ideas of equilibrium statistical mechanics have
richly contributed to the mathematical theory of smooth dynamical systems (with
the concepts of entropy, Gibbs states, etc., see my note in BAMS(NS) 19 (1988),
259-268). [3][p. 197.]
K. Uhlenbeck:
The relationship between physics and mathematics has been fundamental to both for
a long time. The gap between the two is significant primarily in this century, as pure
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mathematics became very abstract, experimental physics became very expensive, and
the world became more complicated. However, even through this century, mathemat-
ics has relied on physics for input quite steadily. [...] I am sure other replies will point
out the influence of mechanics on calculus, optics on Riemannian and symplectic ge-
ometry, general relativity on differential geometry, quantum mechanics on functional
analysis, geometric optics on harmonic analysis, and gauge theory on four-manifold
topology. [3][p. 202.]
A more recent formulation of the idea of physics motivating research in pure mathematics can
be found in [6].
Accepting von Neumann’s (quasi-empiricist) position about mathematics has consequences:
One is that it is perfectly understandable that mathematical concepts ”apply effectively” in
physics. Thus Wigner’s wondering in [43] as to why mathematics applies effectively in physics
seems mysterious on the basis of von Neumann’s position: it would be perfectly unreasonable and
mysterious if mathematics were not effective, given that mathematics is coming from physics.
The effectiveness becomes mysterious only if one sees mathematics as emerging in a process that
is cut off from empirical science – as Wigner sees this, in sharp contrast to von Neumann:
[...] it is unquestionably true that the concepts of elementary mathematics and par-
ticularly elementary geometry were formulated to describe entities which are directly
suggested by the actual world, the same does not seem to be true of the more ad-
vanced concepts, in particular the concepts which play such an important role in
physics. [43]
In a recent paper [10] Grinbaum argues that effectiveness of mathematics in physics also is
perfectly reasonable and not mysterious in cases when mathematics serves in a regulative role
that guides and constrains theory building in physics in situations when physics is not (yet) in
the position of formulating natural laws based on detailed understanding of phenomena.
The other consequence is that, since the creation of rigorous, well-defined mathematical
concepts motivated by physics is not a simple process, it can happen that developing the math-
ematical concepts motivated by physics takes a long time. During this time not only physics
is left without a proper mathematical concept but even mathematics can appear imprecise and
foggy.
4 Absence of rigor in mathematics?
But can mathematics itself be non-rigorous, imprecise, non-exact? This is controversial but
many mathematicians have taken the position that rigor/precision/exactness are not binary and
are not absolute notions but come in different forms, in different degrees, in different contexts
and they change over time. This is again a position that von Neumann took:
[...] it is hardly possible to believe in the existence of an absolute, immutable concept
of mathematical rigour, dissociated from all human experience. I am trying to take
a very low-brow attitude on this matter. Whatever philosophical or epistemological
preferences anyone may have in this respect, the mathematical fraternities’ actual
experiences with its subject give little support to the assumption of the existence of
an a priori concept of mathematical rigour. [40]
Other similar expressions:
M. Atiyah:
The history of mathematics is full of instances of happy inspiration triumphing over
a lack of rigour. Euler’s use of wildly divergent series or Ramanujan’s insights are
among the more obvious [...] The marvelous formulae emerging at present from
heuristic physical arguments are the modern counterparts of Euler and Ramanujan,
and they should be accepted in the same spirit of gratitude tempered with caution.
[3][p. 178]
R. Thom:
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I do still believe that rigor is a relative notion, not an absolute one. It depends on
the background readers have and are expected to use in their judgment. Since the
collapse of Hilbert’s program and the advent of Go¨del’s theorem, we know that rigor
can be no more than a local and sociological criterion. [3][p. 203]
5 Mathematical precision is not welcome in physics
by physicists – Tension of type II
Even when precise mathematical concepts are available to use in theoretical physics, physicists
typically do not aim at mathematical precision. Some regard it as not useful, or irrelevant,
or illusory, or impossible; some explicitly reject it as unimportant. I call the tension arising
from physicists’ dismissive attitude towards mathematical precision Tension of type II. Below
are quotations as evidence for the presence of this kind of tension between mathematics and
physics.
A. Jaffee and F. Quinn:
The typical attitude of physicists toward mathematics is illustrated by a passage
from a book of P. W. Anderson, ”We are talking here about theoretical physics, and
therefore of course mathematical rigor is irrelevant and impossible.” [14][p. 5] 3
R. Feynman:
The mathematical rigor of great precision is not very useful in physics. But one
should not criticize the mathematicians on this score [...] They are doing their own
job. [8][p. 56]
W. Thirring:
For a long time his [von Neumanns] importance for physics was underrated, Pauli
once told me that he had said to v. Neumann: ”If a mathematical proof is what
matters in physics you would be a great physicist”. I disagree with this statement, I
think he had the right vision of what will become important in physics. [32][p. 5]
That mathematical precision is somewhat alien in physics is reflected by the controversial status
of mathematical physics as a discipline: mathematical physicists find themselves between two
chairs, as scholars who are doing something non-standard, weird, something that is not really
appreciated either by mathematicians or by physicists, and frequently they are on the defensive.
This feeling is reflected by Wightman’s remark:
The physicists who have engaged in this kind of work [doing axiomatic/constructive
QFT] are sometimes dubbed the Veldferein [sic!]. Cynical observers have compared
them to the Shakers, a religious sect of New England who built solid barns and led
celibate lives, a non-scientific equivalent of proving rigorous theorems and calculating
no cross sections. [27][Introduction]
Given that the Shakers, due to the celibacy they adopted, have become nearly extinct4, Wight-
man effectively regards mathematical physicists as an endangered species. Fortunately, mathe-
matical physics has not faded away as a discipline. But Wightman’s words express the feeling
that pursuing mathematical physics is something of a problematic scientific activity.
3Jaffee-Quinn’s footnote: ”This is attributed by Anderson to Landau. Anderson continues, ‘This is not quite so,
but it is very close to it.’ However, he revealingly remembered the passage incorrectly; it reads [Landau-Lifshitz [16]],
‘No attempt has been made at mathematical rigor in the treatment, since this is anyhow illusory in theoretical physics
[...]’.” [14][p. 5]
4”Before the Civil War there were nearly 6000 Shakers in 23 communities. Today, there is just one active Shaker
village left, with just three members.” [1]
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6 Why physicists do not appreciate mathematical pre-
cision
There are two, intertwined intuitions in the dismissive attitude towards mathematical precision
in physics: a good and a problematic one.
The good intuition in rejecting mathematical precision is that striving for mathematical
precision is not the main, not the decisive source of development of physics: experimenting and
observations are.
The problematic part of the intuition is to think that mathematical precision does not con-
tribute to the development of physics hence it is not useful epistemologically. But striving for
mathematical precision does contribute to the development of physics.
First of all, mathematical precision forces conceptual precision and clarity, coupled with
critical self-reflection. This is nicely formulated by von Neumann in his 1949 letter to Cirker, head
of Dover publishing house, with whom von Neumann apparently discussed a possible publication
of an English translation of his book [38] (see [22][p. 286-287]). In this letter von Neumann
characterizes the nature of his book, which is the paradigm example of a work in mathematical
physics:
The subject-matter is partly physical-mathematical, partly, however, a very involved
conceptual critique of the logical foundations of various disciplines (theory of proba-
bility, thermodynamics, classical mechanics, classical statistical mechanics, quantum
mechanics). This philosophical-epistemological discussion has to be continuously tied
in and quite critically synchronised with the parallel mathematical-physical discus-
sion. It is, by the way, one of the essential justifications of the book, which gives it
a content not covered in other treatises, written by physicists or by mathematicians,
on quantum mechanics. (von Neumann to Cirker, October 3, 1949) [22]
Mathematical precision and explicitness also requires to make the link between the mathematical
model and physical reality explicit and unambiguous. This effect of mathematical precision
can expose serious conceptual-interpretational difficulties even in a mathematically impeccable
physical theory. This contributes to a much better understanding of the theory and can pave
the way to new theories. An example of this is von Neumann’s tidying up mathematically the
Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics and his subsequent abandoning it: Soon after
the Hilbert space formalism had been worked out precisely, difficulties with the interpretation
from the perspective of the frequency interpretation of quantum probability became visible.
von Neumann had hoped to get around the difficulties by suggesting the theory of type II1
factor von Neumann algebras as the suitable framework for quantum theory – together with a
logical interpretation of quantum probability replacing the frequency view. (See the papers [2],
[20], [21], [24], [33] for the details of this story, including the discussion of why von Neumann’s
suggestion was unsatisfactory.)
Mathematical precision, especially if it is realized in an axiomatic formulation of a physical
theory, also makes explicit the conceptual structure and logical dependencies within a theory.
Constructive (axiomatic) quantum field theory illustrates this nicely. Mathematical precision
also contributes to the clarification of relation of different physical theories – ergodic theory is
an example of this effect of mathematical precision.
Forcing conceptual precision, requiring unambiguous relation of mathematics and physical
reality, clarifying intra- and intertheoretic relations of physical theories, and thereby exposing
possible conceptual difficulties – these are epistemic virtues different from (and in addition to)
descriptive accuracy and predictive success.
But acknowledging that mathematical precision is useful epistemologically is not easy for
psychologically-flavored reasons that are intimately related to the specific way mathematical
precision is epistemologically useful: mathematical precision forces conceptual precision and
clarity. But conceptual precision makes it also clear what is not clear conceptually at a given
time in physics. Thus mathematical precision, through forcing conceptual precision, exposes the
fundamental limits of a physical theory at a given time. Since at that time it might not be possible
to go beyond those limits by creating new and better physical theories, this is an epistemologically
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frustrating situation. This can be frustrating psychologically : it can be perceived by physicists as
limits of their own, subjective capabilities (cleverness, ingenuity, creativity, intellectual power).
This is unpleasant, can be experienced as an existential threat and it is understandable that
physicists do not wish to experience it.
7 Concluding comments
The examples in section 2 illustrate not only the presence of Tension of Type I but also an
important feature of this tension: The mathematical imprecision in physics causing Tension of
Type I is not an ”anything goes” kind of uncontrolled irrationality but a “disciplined sloppiness”:
Newton’s reasoning about derivatives, however objectionable from the perspective of strict logic,
did have a rich, positive content that could be articulated subsequently with precision; Boltz-
mann’s deep intuition about the stochastic behavior of classical mechanical dynamical systems
was an insight with rich informal content that found its precise expression in terms of measure
theory and advanced calculus; and the physical intuition guiding quantization of fields could
be given az axiomatic formulation that could be shown consistent by displaying free quantum
fields. On the basis of these successes one also can expect that heuristic quantum field theory’s
currently mathematically objectionable treatment of interacting quantum fields will eventually
find a form that is mathematically unobjectionable. The current situation in heuristic quantum
field theory might thus be analogous to the one in Newton’s time when the reasoning involving
derivatives was formally objectionable but contentually correct.5
Mathematical precision can play an especially important role in certain fields in current
physics: in areas where theoretical physics has become unusually speculative and has got very
far away from empirical testability. When empirical testability is out of sight, an important
regulative principle of theory construction can be mathematical precision.6
Thus the presence of different type of tensions between physics and mathematics is not the
sign of trouble but a sign of good health of both disciplines.
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